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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #5412-82

30 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.,
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June

1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. Comments on warning situations.

a. Lebanon:

(1) Time is running out on Israel's drive to secure the surrender and expulsion of PLO leaders and forces. The Begin government cannot allow the siege of West Beirut to drag on much longer. If military and political pressures fail to bring about a Palestinian surrender in the next few days, Begin probably will order a final assault.

b. USSR:

(1) Brezhnev's political authority has declined, increasing his vulnerability to pressure for early retirement. Competition between Chernenko and Andropov could bring succession maneuvering to a head in the next few months, possibly while Brezhnev is away on vacation. If Brezhnev's physical condition has suffered another setback, this might impair both his ability to resist pressure to retire and to control the succession process.

c. El Salvador-Nicaragua:

(1) The Sandinista regime may view the coordinated Salvadoran-Honduran military operation against the insurgents in northern Morazan as a potentially serious

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SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June

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threat that requires a strong response. The apparent growth in the hard-liners' influence in Managua increases the chances for such a reaction. The regime, for example, may order attacks on anti-Sandinista camps in Honduras.


(2) Growing anti-Sandinista activity may also produce a significant hardening in Sandinista policy toward El Salvador and Honduras. The regime may soon proclaim a "Socialist Republic" as a means of attracting greater Soviet and Cuban assistance.

d. Mozambique:

(1) There is a strong possibility of a move to overthrow President Machel in the next few weeks. His failure to halt the movement of South African-backed insurgents toward Maputo has increased his vulnerability to a coup attempt.

e. Somalia:

(1) President Siad's position is eroding in the face of discontent in the military, tribal unrest, and an economic crisis. His precarious regime may be ousted in the next three months.


H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.

Attachments:

NIO/LA
NIO/USSR-EE
NIO/AF
NIO/EA
NIO/WE



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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council

23 June 1982

NOTE FOR: See Distribution

FROM :
Acting NIO/USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Warning Assessment: USSR-EE

1. Attached is the assessment prepared following the monthly Community warning meeting held on 22 June 1982. Comments would be most welcome.

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Tuesday, 20 July, at 1400 hours in Room 7E62, CIA Headquarters. I solicit suggestions regarding any topics or contingencies you feel we may be overlooking, and request that such recommendations be forwarded to me by COB Friday, 9 July.

Attachment:
DDI #5187-82

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

DDI #5187-82
23 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Acting National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EESUBJECT : Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 22 June 1982) [REDACTED] 25X1

1. Soviet-Syrian Relations. Despite tensions which may have arisen in the Soviet-Syrian relationship, the two countries still need each other. For the Soviets, Syria is their closest ally in the Middle East, while for the Syrians, the Soviets are the only current source of the arms they need. The partnership will, therefore, continue and may be strengthened by Soviet resupply efforts as well as the possible influx of more Soviet personnel. Any large scale Israeli attack which endangered the viability of the Syrian armed forces, however, would place the Soviets before the dilemma of letting their ally be destroyed or committing their prestige (and risking a confrontation with the US) through the dispatch of troops which could only have a very limited direct impact on the fighting.

2. Yugoslavia. The LCY Party Congress. Despite the mandated two-thirds turnover in the Presidium, few political or economic innovations are expected. The central leadership has been unable to get regional leaders to accept either greater political or economic controls--a development which bodes ill for Yugoslavia's financial planning. The Congress may be marked by renewed demonstrations in Kosovo but the regime is undoubtedly prepared and should be able to control them.

3. Poland. Prospects for the Summer. The stalemate is likely to continue with the regime unwilling to make meaningful concessions and the opposition unwilling to surrender but unable to mount a frontal attack. The regime and the church will continue their indirect bargaining over the papal

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visit, with each party trying to gain advantages from the bargaining and neither one wanting the onus for postponing the visit. However, since the celebrations which are the reason for the visit last all year, there is no great time pressure and the indirect bargaining could last for months.

4. Soviet Leadership Developments: The changes made at the May Central Committee Plenum (the Andropov and Fedorchuk personnel decisions) have neither clarified the pecking order nor stopped maneuverings and rumors. Even though there is no evidence of a further deterioration in Brezhnev's health, his authority has clearly waned and the succession remains the most important hidden agenda item for the Politburo.

5. GDR Peace Movement. The movement is both idealistic and realistic in its recognition that its maneuvering room is limited. It could probably be destroyed on short notice by the security apparatus but is kept alive because of the need not to alienate the West German peace movement. However, its long-term impact might be an increase of political activism outside of previously prescribed areas.



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